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Abstract 
After the introduction of the euro in 1999, the debate on the financial stability 
architecture in the EU focused on the adequacy of a decentralised setting based on 
national responsibilities for preventing and managing crises. The Financial Services 
Action Plan in 1999 and the introduction of the Lamfalussy process for financial 
regulation and supervision in 2001 enhanced the decentralised arrangements by 
increasing significantly the level of legal harmonisation and supervisory cooperation. In 
addition, authorities adopted EU-wide MoUs to safeguard cross-border financial 
stability. In this context, the financial crisis has proved to be a major challenge to  the 
ongoing process of European financial integration. In particular, momentous events 
such as the freezing of interbank markets, the loss of confidence in financial institutions, 
runs on banks and difficulties affecting cross-border financial groups, questioned the 
ability of the EU financial stability architecture to contain threats to the integrated single 
financial market. In particular, the crisis has demonstrated the importance of coupling to 
micro-prudential supervision a macro  dimension aimed at a b road and effective 
monitoring and assessment of the potential risks covering all components of the 
financial system. In  Europe, following the de Larosière Report, the European 
Commission has put forward proposals for establishing a European System of Financial 
Supervision and a European Systemic Risk Board, the latter body to be set up under 
the auspices of the ECB. While the details for the implementation of these structures 
still need to be spelt out, they should reinforce significantly  – ten years after  the 
introduction of the euro – the financial stability architecture at the EU level.  
&  & 
Introduction  
The financial crisis has put the global and European financial stability architectures to a 
momentous test. In particular, the crisis has highlighted key features of the financial 
market landscape, which had been possibly underestimated and need to be addressed 
by a new structure for financial regulation and supervision. Such features include the 
increasing relevance of systemic risk stemming from structural developments related to 
financial integration and financial innovation, as well as the close links between the 
financial system and the real economy. As a result, the crisis largely materialised out of 
mutually reinforcing dynamics between macroeconomic conditions, structural changes, 
and the specific vulnerabilities linked to individual institutions. These dynamics were not 
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sufficiently captured by the regulatory and supervisory system. Therefore, the crisis 
reinforced the view that the safeguarding of financial stability requires an effective 
combination of micro and macro-prudential approaches to regulation and supervision.
1 
In light of the lessons stemming from the crisis, the policy recommendations for 
regulatory reform emerging in global fora and in Europe suggest that there is consensus 
in the direction of  introducing  the tools and structures devoted to macro-prudential 
supervision, as well as of ensuring an effective interplay with micro-prudential 
supervision and the monitoring of individual financial institutions. At the international 
level, the G-20 Action Plan,
2 the strengthening of the role of the International Monetary 
Fund and the Financial Stability Board, as well as the initiatives taken by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision,
3 include elements towards strengthening the 
macro-prudential components of the regulatory system. In the EU, the European 
Commission set-up a High-Level Group chaired by Jacques de Larosière to give advice 
on the future of European financial regulation and supervision. The High Level Group 
recommended in February 2009 a new EU financial stability architecture based on a 
two-pillar structure comprising a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), for the 
conduct of macro-prudential oversight, and a European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), for supporting supervisory coordination and convergence of supervisory 
standards.
4 The Commission issued the legislative proposals for the setting-up of these 
structures on 23 September 2009.
5  
Against this background, this article provides an overview of the main features of the 
new European financial stability architecture on the basis of the state of play by 20 
October 2009. The structure of this article is as follows. The first Section will describe 
the evolution of the financial stability framework in the EU. The second Section will refer 
to the main lessons from the crisis and the regulatory reforms taking place.  The third 
and fourth sections will focus on the features of the ESRB and ESFS, respectively. The 
fifth section will identify the main challenges for the new architecture to work effectively. 
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1.  The evolution of the European financial stability framework 
The development of the financial stability framework in the EU can essentially be traced 
back to 1985, the year in which the single market approach to financial services was 
introduced with the Commission’s White Paper.
6 The 1985 White Paper was the 
culmination of a number of economic, political and legal factors which provided the 
conditions for progress in European financial market integration. It represented the 
political willingness for undertaking economic reform, namely in the direction of market 
liberalisation and further market integration within the Community.  
The 1985 White Paper put forward three key principles of legal and market integration.
7 
First, the principle of  home-country control, according to which the primary task of 
regulating a financial institution and its branches established in host countries would be 
entrusted to the authorities of the Member State of origin. The financial institution would, 
therefore, only report to its home-country authorities regarding both domestic and cross-
border provision of services directly or through branches.  
The second principle was the mutual recognition by Member States and their respective 
authorities of the regulatory regimes and practices of each other. Financial institutions 
would be free to provide financial services directly or through branches in the jurisdiction 
of host Member States, subject to the laws,  regulation and supervision of the home-
country. For host-countries, this would imply recognising that the safeguard of the public 
interests underlying financial regulation in their jurisdictions  – such as depositor and 
investor protection, and financial stability – would be adequately pursued by the home-
country authorities.  
Third, home-country control and mutual recognition would be supported by the minimum 
harmonisation of national laws, which would set the standards regarding authorisation, 
supervision and winding-up of financial institutions
8. The application of these principles 
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would provide a  single passport to financial institutions for the provision of services 
throughout the Community.
9  
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 set out the framework for EMU and the creation of the 
single currency, involving the establishment of the ECB and the ESCB.
10 The 
introduction of the euro implied the establishment of the first federal regulatory structure 
of the Community through the full transfer of competences on monetary policy to the 
ECB and the ESCB. This move towards federalisation was based on the realisation  – 
diagnosed in the 1989 Delors Report  – that the development of the single market 
necessitated more effective co-ordination of economic policy between national 
authorities, as there was a fundamental incompatibility between (i) full freedom of 
capital, (ii) freedom to provide cross-border financial services, (iii) fixed exchange rate 
under ERM, and (iv) autonomous monetary policy.
11  
The federalisation of the currency and monetary policy in 1999 provided the impetus for 
the regulatory reform of the single financial market and the introduction of EU-wide 
regulatory structures. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which was launched 
in May 1999, provided the basis for the renewal of the Community policy on financial 
services following the introduction of the euro. Its aim was to obtain the commitment of 
the Council, the Parliament and the Member States to forty-three (mostly) legislative 
initiatives for harmonising by 2005 the national laws relating to the provision of financial 
services. Such initiatives represented a shift from implementing the single passport 
concept on the basis of minimum harmonisation to an approach based on a high-level 
of harmonisation of national laws.  
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In 2001, the so-called Lamfalussy Report
12 (after the chairman of a “Committee of Wise 
Men” established by the ECOFIN in 2000) provided the overall diagnosis that there was 
a lack of  an EU regulatory system able to provide practical effect to Community 
legislation and also to cope with the needs of a single financial market as a whole. 
Community law provided both insufficient and unsatisfactory harmonisation and 
uniformity among national laws, was cumbersome to design and adopt, and the 
procedure for law-making was too rigid for coping with the fast pace of market 
integration. The governance of financial markets was provided by an uneven patchwork 
of national laws, regulations and enforcement practices. This was particularly worrisome 
at the time since the FSAP contained a number of measures, most of them directives, 
aimed at introducing a complete, coherent and consistent legislative and regulatory 
framework for securities markets. At the rhythm of current procedures and with the 
current loose implementation practices by Member States, the FSAP would not be able 
to meet its objectives. 
The Lamfalussy report led to the setting-up of a European regulatory system for the 
single financial market in 2003. Such regulatory system would rely on the existing 
institutional framework for the adoption of Community legislation. It would not involve 
any transfer of competences from the national to the Community level, thus not 
requiring any Treaty change. The regulatory system comprised essentially two 
elements:  
(1) the expansion of the use of comitology procedures for Community legislation, in 
order to enable more flexible, swift and detailed enactment of rules at the European 
level; and  
(2) the establishment of committees of national regulators (supervisors), in order to 
facilitate, on the one hand, the development of EU-wide regulatory solutions in the form 
of technical advice to the Commission, and, on the other hand, the convergence of 
national regulatory practices in the implementation of Community  law. As a result, the 
governance of the single financial market became largely based on a committee-
architecture, without any transfer of competences to the Community.  
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Figure 1: the Lamfalussy committee-structure for financial regulation and 
supervision 
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The process of European financial integration accelerated as a result of these efforts to 
provide an EU-wide framework for the provision of cross-border financial services. This 
led to the integration of financial markets, the emergence of pan-European banking 
groups and financial conglomerates, and to the consolidation of some market 
infrastructures.
13 At the same time, such integration also led to broader and deeper 
systemic inter-linkages across the EU, which increased the likelihood that a disturbance 
in one Member State would spillover into other Member States and the single financial 
market as a whole. 
The awareness of financial stability authorities of the increasing systemic inter-linkages 
between Member States provided the impetus for the enhancement of the European 
arrangements for dealing with financial crises. In May 2005, the EU Banking 
Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on co-operation in financial crisis situations, which set out 
principles and procedures for sharing information, views and assessments, in order to 
facilitate the pursuance of national mandates and preserve the overall stability of the 
financial system of individual Member States and of the EU as a whole. This MoU was 
replaced in June 2008, by an MoU on cross-border financial stability which provides for 
further detailed procedures and structures for crisis management, including (1) common 
principles, including on the sharing of a potential fiscal burden between Member States; 
(2) rules regarding the coordination of home-country authorities; (3) the creation of 
Cross-Border Stability Groups, composed of the authorities of various Member States 
with a view to enhance preparedness in normal times and facilitate the resolution of a 
cross-border crisis; (4)  a template for Voluntary Specific Cooperation Agreements 
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among authorities, and (5) a template for a Systemic Assessment Framework, offering a 
common methodology to assess the systemic implications of a crisis.
14 
In addition to the MoU, EU-wide cooperation for safeguarding financial stability is based 
on a number of EU committees. These include: (1) the Financial Stability Table of the 
Economic and Financial Committee, which meets at least twice a year (spring and 
autumn) in order to prepare a financial stability assessment for the ECOFIN; (2) the 
Financial Services Committee, comprising finance ministries’ representatives, which 
also provides advice to the ECOFIN; (3) the Banking Supervision Committee of the 
ESCB, which monitors financial sector developments from a financial stability 
perspective and promotes cooperation between national central banks, supervisory 
authorities and the ECB; and (4) the Level 3 Committees (CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS) , 
which also regularly offer an assessment of the risks to financial stability in the EU. 
In conclusion, the European arrangements for safeguarding financial stability were 
based on the guiding principle that a decentralised institutional setting mostly based on 
the exercise of national responsibilities would be able to prevent and manage crises 
affecting the single financial market. The national authorities of home - and host-country 
authorities would cooperate in the management of a crisis on the basis of Community 
legislation and non-binding agreements such as Memorandum of Understanding. 
However, also due to the potential impact on national fiscal responsibilities, national 
authorities would preserve full responsibility and discretion in the actions to take to 
manage a crisis situation.
15  
2.  The lessons of the financial crisis in Europe 
The financial crisis unfolded in Europe in July 2007 with the first reports of sub-prime 
related losses suffered by the European banks and in August 2007 with the freezing of 
interbank markets.
16 The crisis involved a number of significant events of financial 
instability which included a loss of confidence in the soundness of European banks, 
bank-runs, the prospect of failure of cross-border and domestic financial institutions 
which required recapitalisation measures,
17 and even the financial collapse of an entire 
country which was part of the EU single financial market as a member of the EEA.  
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These events revealed inadequacies in the institutional and regulatory frameworks to 
safeguard the stability of domestic financial systems and of the single financial market 
as a whole. The main lessons that are being drawn for the European financial stability 
arrangements may be summarised as follows. 
First, the financial crisis has challenged fundamental assumptions regarding the 
functioning and expansion of the single financial market. It highlighted in particular the 
so-called “trilemma of financial stability” according to which (1) a stable financial system, 
(2) an integrated financial system and (3) national financial autonomy are incompatible.
 
18 The incompatibility derives basically from the fact that the single financial market was 
constructed in a setting where market integration is managed on the basis of home - 
host-country relationships and where the economic benefits of integration are spread 
and shared among Member States. Conversely the common economic risks stemming 
from the increased financial integration are not mutualised but rather dealt with on the 
basis of national responsibilities, as regulators and governments remain only 
accountable to national parliaments and taxpayers.
19 Therefore, the framework of the 
single financial market implies that as market integration increases, the common 
economic risks expand and need to be address as a matter of common concern among 
Member States. As an evidence of this, Member States took coordinated actions to 
jointly support the single financial market at the euro area summit of Heads of State in 
Paris on 12 October 2008. Looking forward, this implies that the framework for financial 
stability has to be continuously enhanced to address such risks, particularly when the 
degree of market integration leads to significant cross-border spillovers in the case of a 
crisis.  
Second, the crisis demonstrated the need for an adequate macro-prudential supervision 
of the financial system. In particular, the crisis demonstrated the importance of 
monitoring, assessing and mitigating the risks to the financial system as a whole that 
may derive from the collective behaviour of financial institutions, their interaction in 
financial markets and from the close links between the financial system and the macro-
economy. In this context, the crisis has shown that the nature and magnitude of the 
systemic risk in the financial sector is related not only to the potential illiquidity or 
insolvency of large banks or other major regulated financial institutions, but it also 
depends on the degree of “interconnectedness” or “interdependence” between financial 
institutions and between markets. Therefore, the introduction of macro-prudential 
supervision would allow capturing the factors and processes that can affect the stability 
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of the financial system as a whole.
20 This is in contrast with the scope of micro-
prudential supervision, which focuses on the factors and processes that can affect the  
stability of individual financial institutions, thus aiming to ensure that financial institutions 
have a strong shock-absorbing capacity and effective risk management.
21  
Third, the crisis also provided further evidence of the implications of increasing financial 
integration at the EU and global levels for the design of the financial stability framework. 
In particular, the cross-border distribution and propagation of systemic risk needs to be 
monitored addressed by  appropriate structures. At the global level, the Financial 
Stability Board was established by the G-20 for this purpose. Within the EU, the growing 
presence and significance of cross-border financial institutions requires the 
strengthening of the pan-European character of supervision. At the same time, it also 
requires close cooperation and efficient information exchange between the financial 
stability authorities, and in particular supervisory authorities and central banks on a 
cross-border basis.  
Lastly, the crisis demonstrated that an effective financial safety net for the operation of 
the single European financial market requires a more extensive convergence and 
harmonisation of national arrangements, also in matters deeply rooted in Member 
States’ legal systems. This includes areas such as deposit guarantee schemes, early 
intervention tools, and bank resolution regimes. 
These lessons are reflected in the series of comprehensive reviews which are taking 
place at the national and European levels to enhance the legal and regulatory system 
for financial stability.  
At the national level,
22 experiences such as those with the bank run on Northern Rock 
on 15 September 2007 and problems in other UK banks,
23 the failures of Icelandic 
banks, the losses suffered by German banks, and the difficulties affecting the Fortis and 
the Dexia banking groups provided the basis for important reports setting out 
recommendations on improvements to national regulatory systems. These reports 
include, among others, the Turner Review in the UK,
24 the Issing Report in Germany,
25 
                                                   
20   See The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR), 2009. 
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See also M. Aglietta and L. Scialom, A systemic approach to financial regulation: a European perspective, in Working Paper 
2009-29, available at http://economix.u-paris10.fr. 
22   For an overview of the individual cases assessed by the European Commission under state aid rules, see  Report from the 
Commission: State aid scoreboard, Spring 2009 Update, Special edition on state aid interventions in the current financial 
and economic crisis, 08.04.2009, COM(2009) 164. 
23   See the account provided in The Run on the Rock, Report by the UK House of Commons Treasury Committee setting out its 
findings on the Northern Rock case, issued on 24 January 2008, available at www. parliament.uk.  
24   The Turner Review: a regulatory response to the global banking crisis, Financial Services Authority, March 2009, available 
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and the Lamfalussy Report in Belgium.
26 These reports generally acknowledge the 
need for (1) improving financial regulation and supervision at the European level, (2) 
introducing macro-prudential supervision in national systems (e.g. through systemic risk 
committees), and (3) devising specific rules for dealing with crisis situations and 
upgrading existing ones, such as relating to deposit-guarantee schemes. 
At the European level, the Commission mandated in October 2008 a High-Level Group, 
chaired by Jacques de Larosière, with the mandate to put forward proposals to improve 
the arrangements for financial supervision in the EU in light of the financial crisis 
experience.
27  The Economic and Financial Committee also mandated in December 
2008 a High-Level Working Group, chaired by Lars Nyberg, to draw the lessons for the 
financial crisis management arrangements.
28 The Commission adopted in May 2009 a 
Communication on European Financial Supervision, which set out the proposed steps 
for enhancing the EU supervisory arrangements, and which were broadly endorsed by 
the ECOFIN Council of 9 June and the European Council of 18 and 19 June 2009.
29 In 
addition, the Commission initiated reviews and put forward proposals for enhancing the 
Community legislation in areas such as  banking supervision, deposit-guarantee 
schemes, and bank resolution regimes.  
The ECOFIN Council in Luxembourg on 20 October 2009 consolidated all these 
initiatives in a single European roadmap which sets out the short, medium and long 
term priorities in strengthening EU financial supervision, stability and regulation. These 
priorities include actions on (1) the supervisory framework, (2) the framework for crisis 
prevention, management and resolution, (3) the regulatory framework, and (4) 
promoting the integrity of financial markets.
30 
                                                                                                                                                                    
25   New Financial Order: Recommendations by the Issing Committee, Part I (October 2008) and Part II (March 2009), Center for 
Financial Studies, University of Frankfurt, White Papers no.1 and no.2, respectively, February 2009, available at 
http://www.ifk-cfs.de  
26   High-Level Committee on a N ew Financial Architecture, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, June 2009, available at 
http://www.docufin.fgov.be 
27   The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, February 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu. The de Larosière 
Report, acknowledges the limitations of the institutional and legal architecture of the single financial market which were 
made evident by the crisis. In order to enhance the European framework, the de Larosière Report contains a comprehensive 
set of recommendations at the EU level covering: (1) F inancial regulation and international cooperation, with 
recommendations covering a wide range of areas, including Basel II, accounting rules, credit rating agencies, Solvency 2, 
hedge funds, securitised products and derivatives, investment funds, corporate governance, internal risk management of 
financial institutions (Recommendations 1 - 12); (2) Financial  crisis management, with recommendations covering a 
framework for managing crises, the further harmonisation of deposit-guarantee schemes, and the need for Member States to 
agree on more detailed criteria for burden sharing than those contained in the existing Memorandum of Understanding, which 
should be amended accordingly (Recommendations 13-15); and (3) The European supervisory framework, with proposals for 
the setting-up of a two-pillar structure for the EU regulatory and supervisory architecture. In particular, it proposes to 
distinguish at the EU level the conduct of macro- from micro-prudential supervision through the establishment of two distinct 
structures. 
28   ECOFIN Council Conclusions of 20 October 2009, available at www.se2009.eu and www.consilium.europa.eu 
29   Communication from the Commission - European financial supervision, COM/2009/0252 final.  
30   ECOFIN Council Conclusions of 20 October 2009, available at www.se2009.eu Page 11 
 
3.  The European System of Financial Supervision  
The de Larosière Report identified a number of weaknesses relating to the conduct of 
financial supervision at the EU level.
31 Such weaknesses included issues relating to (1) 
supervisory failures with regard to individual institutions; (2) the impossibility to 
challenge supervisory practices on a cross-border basis; (3) the lack of frankness and 
cooperation between supervisors; (4) the lack of consistent powers across Member 
States; (5) the lack of recourses in the Level 3 Committees; and (6) the lack of means 
for supervisors to take common decisions.
32 
In this context, in its Communication on European Financial Supervision, the 
Commission considered that the EU has reached the limits of what can be done with the 
Level 3 committees. These committees only play an advisory technical role to the 
Commission and do not provide a mechanism to ensure cooperation and information 
exchange between national supervisors and the best possible supervisory decisions for 
cross-border institutions. In addition, the patchwork of national regulatory and 
supervisory requirements may prevent joint action by national supervisors, which may 
lead to the prevalence of national solutions in responding to European problems.
33 
Following the recommendations of the de Larosière Report and the Commission 
Communication, as well as the Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9 June 2009 and 
of the European Council of 18 and 19 June 2009, the Commission adopted on 23 
September 2009 legislative proposals to enhance the EU supervisory framework. In the 
micro-prudential field, the Commission put forward proposals for Regulations of the 
European Parliament and the Council leading to the setting-up of a European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS).  
The ESFS would be established as an integrated network comprising the national 
supervisors and three new European Supervisory Authorities (replacing the existing 
Level 3 committees): a European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and a European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). The Authorities will be Community bodies with a legal personality.
34  
In addition, the three new Authorities will cooperate through a Joint Committee of 
European Supervisory Authorities, composed of the Chairpersons of the Authorities. 
                                                   
31   See Guido Ferrarini and Filippo Chiodini, Regulating cross-border banks in Europe: a comment on the de Larosière report 
and a modest proposal, Capital Markets Law Journal 2009, 4 (Supplement 1): pp.S123-pp.S140. 
32   See paragraphs 152 to 166 of the de Larosière Report. 
33   See Commission Communication, European Financial Supervision, COM(2009) 252 final, 27.5.2009, p.8-ff. 
34   For the characterisation of the new European Supervisory Authorities as a new type of European agency, see E. Chiti,  An 
important part of the EU’s institutional machinery: Features, problems and perspectives of European agencies, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol.46, No. 5, October 2009, pp.1395-1442. Page 12 
This Committee should also aim at ensuring supervisory consistency across sectors. In 
this context, there will be a Subcommittee to deal specifically with cross-sectoral issues, 
including financial conglomerates. 
Figure 2: the European System for Financial Supervision (ESFS) 
Current institutional setting    ESFS 
Coordination of the three 
committees on the basis of a 
Joint Protocol 
Cross-sectoral  Joint Committee of European 
Supervisory Authorities 
Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS)   Banking  European Banking Authority 
(EBA)  
Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS) 
Insurance 
European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) 
Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR)   Securities  European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) 
Colleges of supervisors for banking and insurance groups 
National supervisors 
 
The establishment of the ESFS is expected to enhance significantly the framework for 
financial supervision in the EU. In particular, the ESFS will have the objectives of (1) 
improving the coordination of cross border supervision, including through colleges of 
supervisors and ensuring consistent supervisory decisions across borders; (2) raising 
the quality of financial regulation across the EU, including through a consistent 
application of rules and the development of a single EU rulebook; (3) improving crisis 
prevention, coordination and management across the EU as a whole; and (4) improving 
the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision. 
In order to fulfil these objectives, the new European Supervisory Authorities will take on 
all the tasks of the existing supervisory committees – CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR – and 
in addition have significantly increased responsibilities, defined legal powers and 
greater authority than the committees. According to the Commission’s proposals, the 
tasks and powers of the Authorities will include the following.  
First, the Authorities will issue technical standards with the aim of identifying and 
removing differences among national financial regulations, which may stem from 
exceptions and derogations allowed under Community law. This should allow 
developing a harmonised core set of standards across the EU, which will provide as 
much as a possible a single rulebook for participants in the single financial market. In 
order for standards to be as effective as possible, the Commission will endorse them as 
Community law, thus providing for binding legal effect at the EU level. Page 13 
Second, they will issue guidelines and recommendations that contribute to ensuring 
coherent application of Community legislation. These guidelines and recommendations 
will not have a legally binding nature, but national supervisors will have an interest in 
complying with them in order to provide a level playing field for market participants. The 
Authorities will conduct periodical peer reviews of national supervisors’ activities in order 
to enhance consistency in supervisory practices. 
Third, the Authorities may also issue recommendations to specific national supervisors, 
particularly when a specific supervisor is considered to be diverging from the existing 
Community legislation, including the technical standards. This will therefore represent a 
mechanism for supporting the compliance with the Authorities’ instruments.  
Fourth, the Authorities will be expected to play a coordination role in financial crisis 
situations – which are defined as adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise 
the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or 
part of the financial system in the Community. In particular, they will be expected to 
promote a coordinated Community response by facilitating the exchange of information 
between supervisors, determining the scope and verifying the reliability of relevant 
information, acting as mediator between supervisors, and notifying the European 
Systemic Risk Board of any potential emergency situation.  In this context, the 
Authorities may adopt decisions requiring national supervisors to take an appropriate 
action to address the risks in the crisis situation. The types of action that may be taken 
will be defined in Community legislation. Furthermore, if a national supervisor does not 
comply with the decision, the Authorities may adopt a decision directed at a specific 
financial institution requiring it to comply with the relevant Community legislation.  
Fifth, the Authorities will contribute to the efficient and consistent functioning of colleges 
of supervisors. The Authorities may participate as observers in colleges and receive all 
relevant information shared between the members of the college. In addition, the 
Authorities will have the task to collect information for national supervisors in order to 
facilitate the work of colleges. In this context, the Authorities will have the obligation to 
establish and manage a central database to make information available to the national 
supervisors involved in colleges.  
Sixth, the Authorities will have the general task of contributing to consistent supervision 
across the EU. In addition to the tools of technical standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations, the Authorities may, in case of disagreements among national 
supervisors on cooperation, coordination or joint decision-making, take a decision, after 
an attempt for conciliation, requiring the national supervisors to take or refrain from 
taking action. Moreover, the Authorities can also facilitate the delegation of tasks among Page 14 
supervisors, and generally support a common supervisory culture through opinions, 
reviews, and training programmes. 
Seventh, the Authorities will be able to collect information from supervisors and other 
public authorities of Member States necessary to carry out their tasks.  
Lastly, the Authorities will be responsible for monitoring and assessing market 
developments, particularly with regard to the relevant micro-prudential trends, potential 
risks and vulnerabilities. For this purpose, the Authorities shall conduct stress-testing 
exercises, in cooperation with the ESRB. The outcome of such monitoring and 
assessment should be conveyed to the ESRB, the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission. 
Figure 3: The toolbox of the European Supervisory Authorities 
  Tools 
1 Guidelines and recommendations for the consistent supervisory practices and 
application of EU law 
2 Specific recommendations to national supervisors failing to ensure compliance of 
financial institutions with EU law  
3 Last resort decisions addressed to individual financial institutions not in compliance 
with EU law 
4 Decisions addressed to national supervisors in crisis situations 
5 Last resort decisions addressed to individual financial institutions in crisis situations  
6 Collection of information and setting-up of central database 
7 Mediation of disagreements between national supervisors, including the possibility to 
address decisions to national supervisors to take or refrain from taking action  
In addition to these  tasks, which are common to all Authorities, the ESMA will have 
supervisory powers for credit rating agencies. Such powers could include the power to 
request information and to conduct investigations or on-site inspections and, in addition, 
such as the possibility to withdraw the registration or suspend the use for regulatory 
purposes of credit ratings The responsibilities of ESMA in this regard will be possibly 
defined in an amendment to the Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies.  
The framework proposed by the Commission for the European Supervisory Authorities 
implies that national supervisors will continue carrying out day-to-day supervision, also 
on the basis of colleges of supervisors, which will be set up for all major cross-border 
institutions. Accordingly, the tasks and powers of the new Authorities are largely of a 
coordinating nature which falls short of a federal architecture such as the one of the 
ECB and the Eurosystem. In the words of the de Larosière Report, the new “European 
System for Financial Supervision would be a largely decentralised structure, fully 
respecting the proportionality and subsidiarity principles of the Treaty. So existing Page 15 
national supervisors, who are closest to the markets and institutions they supervise, 
would continue to carry-out day-to-day supervision and preserve the majority of their 
present competences.”
35 
In this context, an important element of the proposals of the Commission is the 
introduction of a safeguard clause relating to the fiscal responsibilities of Member 
States. In particular, the Commission proposals provide that no decision by the 
Authorities  – namely those adopted in emergency situations and for settling 
disagreements among national supervisors  – may impinge in any way on the fiscal 
responsibilities of Member States. This is in line with the ECOFIN and European 
Council conclusions of June 2009. In order to ensure that this is respected, it is provided 
that, where a Member State considers that a decision by an Authority impinges on its 
fiscal responsibility, it may notify the Authority and the Commission that the national 
supervisor does not intend to implement the Authority's decision. This notification 
should be accompanied by a justification clearly demonstrating how the decision by the 
Authority impinges on fiscal responsibilities. Within a period of one month the Authority 
shall inform the Member State as to whether it maintains its decision or whether it 
amends or revokes it. Where the Authority maintains its decision, the Member State 
may refer the matter to the Council and the decision of the Authority is suspended. The 
Council shall, within two months, decide whether the decision should be maintained or 
revoked, acting by qualified majority. 
In conclusion, the setting proposed by the Commission for the ESFS and the three 
European Supervisory Authorities should enhance significantly the financial regulation 
and supervision at the EU level. This will be achieved by attributing to the Authorities a 
set of tasks and powers, which will be conducive essentially to (1) a single EU rulebook 
for market participants, (2) better coordination at the EU level between national 
supervisors, (3) improved exchange and collection of information relevant for micro -
prudential supervision, and (4) improving the ability of the EU as a whole to respond to 
a financial crisis situation. 
4.  The European Systemic Risk Board  
The de Larosière Report recommended the establishment of a European Systemic Risk 
Council (ESRC) with the responsibility for conducting macro-prudential supervision. The 
report recommended in particular three main design features for the ESRC. First, 
macro-prudential supervision should concern all the financial sector and not only banks. 
Second, macro-prudential supervision should take a wide EU perspective, and take also 
into account the judgements made by the authorities of individual Member States. Third, 
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there must be an effective and enforceable mechanism to translate the assessment of 
risks identified by macro-prudential analysis into specific supervisory actions. In this 
context, the ESRC would have the tasks to “form judgements and make 
recommendations on macro-prudential policy, issue risk warnings, compare 
observations on macro-economic and prudential developments and give direction on 
these issues”.  
The de Larosière Report acknowledged that central banks have a key role to play in a 
macro-prudential framework in view of their role and interest in safeguarding the stability 
of the financial system as a whole. Central banks’ focus on systemic stability puts them 
in a position to better assess not only the likelihood and the potential impact of macro-
shocks or disturbances in domestic and international capital markets, but also the 
operation of common factors affecting the stability of groups and intermediaries. 
Accordingly, the ESRC would be primarily composed of the members of the General 
Council of the ECB, and the ESRC would be set-up under the auspices of the ECB. 
The ECOFIN Council of  9 June renamed the proposed macro-prudential body as 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), possibly in order to follow the terminology used 
for the setting-up of the Financial Stability Board by the G-20 in April 2009.
36  The 
ECOFIN defined many of the features of the ESRB namely with regard to its core tasks, 
the general scope  of financial stability risk warnings and recommendations, the 
composition of the General Board of the ESRB, and considered that the ECB should 
provide analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, also 
drawing on technical advice from national central banks and supervisors.
37 The 
European Council of 18 and 19 June  2009 agreed that the members of the General 
Council of the ECB will elect the ESRB Chair.
38 
The Commission presented on 23 September  2009 two legislative  proposals for the 
setting-up of the ESRB: (1) a proposal for a  Parliament and Council Regulation on 
Community macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a ESRB, 
on the basis of Article 95 of the Treaty, and (2) a  proposal for  Council Decision 
entrusting the ECB with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the ESRB, on the 
basis of Article 105 (6) of the Treaty, which enables the Council to confer upon, through 
unanimity voting, the ECB tasks relating to prudential supervision, after consulting the 
ECB and after receiving the assent of the Parliament.  
                                                   
36   See the Charter of the Financial Stability Board, endorsed at the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit of 25 September 2009, available at 
www.financialstabilityboard.org  
37   See www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/108392.pdf  
38   See www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf  Page 17 
On the basis of the Commission’s legislative proposals, which will be subject to the 
Community’s legislative procedure, the ESRB will have the following distinguishing 
features. 
First, the ESRB will be set up as an independent EU body without legal personality – in 
contrast to the European Supervisory Authorities, which will have  legal personality – 
responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system.
39  
Second, in order to fulfil its mission, the ESRB will be entrusted with a set of tasks, 
which will include (1) the collection and analysis of information, (2) the identification and 
prioritisation of systemic risks, (3) the issuance of warnings where risks are deemed to 
be significant, (4) the issuance of recommendations for remedial action, (5) the 
monitoring of the follow-up to warnings and recommendations, (6) the cooperation and 
exchange of information with the ESFS, and (7) the coordination with the IMF and the 
Financial Stability Board, as well as other relevant macro-prudential bodies. 
Third, the ESRB’s governance  structure includes a General Board composed  of the 
ECB President and Vice-President, the EU central bank governors, the three Chairs of 
the European Supervisory Authorities and the Commission as members with voting 
rights. National supervisors and the Chairman of the Economic and Financial 
Committee are members without voting rights. The Commission’s proposal provides for 
the establishment of a Steering Committee, to set the agenda and prepare the 
decisions,  as well as a Technical Advisory Committee through which the ESRB will 
obtain the assistance of EU central banks and supervisors.  
Fourth, the ECB and the ESCB will play a key role in the functioning of the ESRB. In 
particular, in line with the ECOFIN Conclusions of 9 June 2009, the ECB will provide 
analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB. This entails also 
the provision of the Secretariat, in line with the Commission proposal for  a Council 
Decision. In addition, the ESRB Chair will be elected by the members of the General 
Council of the ECB. The ESRB will also be supported by an advisory committee of EU 
central banks and supervisors, which can in principle be based on the existing ESCB 
Banking Supervision Committee.  
Fifth, the ESRB may request information from the European Supervisory Authorities in 
summary or collective form, such that individual financial institutions cannot be 
identified. If the requested data are not available  to those Authorities or are not made 
available in a timely manner, the ESRB may request the data from national supervisory 
authorities, national central banks or other authorities of Member States. The ESRB 
may also address a reasoned request to the European Supervisory Authorities to 
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provide data that are not in summary or collective form. In this case, the ESRB should 
consult the relevant European Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that the request 
is proportionate. 
Sixth, and most importantly, the ESRB will have the power and obligation to issue risk 
warnings and recommendations. Warnings or recommendations issued by the ESRB 
may be either of a general or specific nature. They may be addressed to the Community 
as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the European 
Supervisory Authorities, or to one or more national supervisors. Recommendations may 
also be addressed to the Commission in respect of the relevant Community legislation. 
In the case of recommendations, they should specify a timeline for the policy response. 
The addressees  will have the obligation to communicate to the ESRB their policy 
response or to explain why they have not acted (“act or explain” mechanism). If the 
ESRB decides that its recommendation has not been followed and that the addressees 
have failed to explain their inaction appropriately, it shall inform the Council and, where 
relevant, the European Supervisory Authorities concerned. 
The degree of effectiveness of the risk warnings and recommendations will be a crucial 
aspect of the functioning and credibility of the macro-prudential tasks to be exercised by 
the ESRB. In particular, the ESRB will have no legally-binding powers to ensure 
compliance by the addressees of risk warnings and recommendations. Therefore, it will 
need to rely on a combination of (i) solid technical analysis, (ii) institutional and policy 
credibility, and (iii) peer pressure as the sources of its legitimacy.  
In this context, the ESRB could rely on the combination of five main tools a nd 
mechanisms. Firstly, the active monitoring by the ESRB on the extent to which its policy 
recommendations are implemented and the mitigating effects of such implementation 
on the identified risks.  
Secondly, the regular reporting to the ECOFIN of the outcome of such monitoring, in 
order to raise attention and foster action by policy-makers.  
Thirdly,  the "act or explain" principle, according to which the addressees of ESRB 
recommendations will be required to take the appropriate remedial action or justify  the 
reasons why they have not acted.  
Fourthly, the close cooperation with the European Supervisory Authorities, particularly 
to support the implementation of recommendations addressed to one or more 
competent n ational supervisory authorities.  In particular, the European Supervisory 
Authorities will be required to use their powers to ensure a timely follow-up. 
Furthermore, when a national supervisor does not follow-up, it has to inform the Board 
of Supervisors of the respective ESA. In its reply to the ESRB, the national supervisor 
has to take into account the input of the respective ESA.  Page 19 
Lastly,  the right of the ESRB to decide to publish its risk warnings and/or 
recommendations on a case by case basis, which may increase the pressure for the 
prompt corrective actions. G iven the sensitiveness of such a publication,  it will be 
expected  the decision of the ESRB would be taken on an exceptional basis, when 
serious threats to financial stability are not being addressed to the extent necessary.  
The appropriate c ombination of these tools and mechanisms, which  will be 
contemplated in the Community legislation establishing the new European financial 
stability architecture, will provide an adequate institutional framework for ensuring the 
effectiveness of the risk warnings and policy recommendations of the ESRB. 
Overall, the proposed establishment of the ESRB will considerably enhance the current 
financial stability framework as it will allow, in particular: (1) overcoming the current lack 
of an integrated financial s tability assessment  at the EU level covering the whole 
financial sector; (2) translating financial stability assessments into risk warnings and 
policy recommendations for EU and national authorities; (iii) exploiting at the EU level 
the central banking, as well as supervisory, analytical capabilities and expertise in 
financial stability and macroeconomic analysis.
40 
Figure 4: The toolbox of the European Systemic Risk Board 
  Tools 
1 Issuance of risk warnings 
2 Issuance of recommendations with a specified timeline for policy response addressed 
to the Community as a whole, to one or more Member States, to one or more of the 
European Supervisory Authorities, or to one or more national supervisors, and also to 
the Commission in respect of Community legislation. 
3 Publication of risk warnings and recommendations 
4 Monitoring of the follow-up to the ESRB recommendations; in particular, the 
addressees have the obligation to communicate to the ESRB their policy response or 
to explain why they have not acted (“act or explain”),  
5 If the ESRB decides that its recommendation has not been followed and that the 
addressees have failed to explain their inaction appropriately, it shall inform the 
Council and, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authorities concerned. 
6 The ESRB may request information from the European Supervisory Authorities in 
summary or collective form, such that individual financial institutions cannot be 
identified. If the requested data are not available to those Authorities or are not made  
available in a timely manner, the ESRB may request the data from national 
supervisory authorities, national central banks or other authorities of Member States. 
The ESRB may address a reasoned request to the European Supervisory Authorities 
to provide data that are not in summary or collective form. 
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5.  Outlook: implementation challenges  
The setting-up of the ESFS and of the ESRB will enhance significantly the EU financial 
stability architecture.
41 The proposed two-pillar framework  for micro-prudential and 
macro-prudential supervision poses a number of challenges in its implementation.  
The first challenge regards the appropriate interplay between the macro- and the micro-
prudential pillars. The aim of the proposed architecture is that the focus of the work of 
the ESRB will be macro, aggregate, systemic and economic in outlook, while the work 
of the micro-ESFS will be micro, prudential, and regulatory.  In this context, it is 
important to achieve the right synergies between the micro- and macro-prudential 
functions in safeguarding financial stability, also in order to avoid overlaps and 
duplication. As analysed above, the Commission’s proposals include a number of 
provisions which aim at ensuring  an adequate ongoing cooperation and sharing of 
information between the ESRB and ESFS, as well as the support of the ESFS in the 
implementation of the ESRB recommendations.  
A second challenge relates to the effective translation of macro-prudential analysis into 
policy actions.  The financial crisis has demonstrated that there was an inadequate 
translation of risk warnings provided by different fora and central banks into concrete 
policy actions. Financial stability assessments were often formulated in broad terms and 
on the basis of alternative benign and less-benign scenarios and outcomes. 
Furthermore, assessments were made with a view to developing the knowledge and 
raising the awareness of authorities, the financial industry, and the public at large with 
regard to potential sources of risks and vulnerabilities to the financial system. They were 
not made with the specific aim of identifying the appropriate policy and regulatory 
actions to safeguard financial stability. The effectiveness of the two-pillar approach in 
the proposed supervisory framework will require the establishment of mechanisms and 
procedures that would ensure that the advice concerning corrective actions that aim at 
containing risks and vulnerabilities is duly reflected in EU and national policies.  
A  third challenge is to set-up appropriate cooperation and c oordination structures 
between macro- and micro-prudential functions also in crisis situations. The crisis has 
shown that that crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis resolution tools should 
be reinforced and be handled in a consistent regulatory framework. In addition, the 
crisis has made it evident that resolving a crisis involving cross-border EU institutions is 
challenging due to the different supervisory, crisis management and resolution tools as 
well as differences and inconsistencies in national legislation regarding company and 
insolvency laws. The proposed supervisory framework will not solve these differences 
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as long as the differences in national legislation are not resolved, and issues such as 
deposit guarantee schemes and burden sharing are not addressed at the EU level.
42  
A final main challenge is to ensure the interaction with international bodies and 
structures.  The financial crisis has underscored the importance of concerted policy 
responses on a global level. To that end, the IMF and the Financial Stability Board are 
expected to play a key role in the early identification and assessment of risks and 
vulnerabilities, the issuance of risk warnings, and the adoption of the related macro -
prudential policies at the global level. In this respect, the interplay between the 
European macro-prudential supervisory body and the IMF/FSB will  be an important 
element.  
Conclusion  
Taken as a whole, the  Commission proposals inspired on the  de Larosière  Report 
provide an innovative and complete blueprint for enhancing and reinforcing the EU 
architecture for financial supervision. They provide a good response for addressing the 
issues highlighted by the crisis as regards the need for further enhancements of the 
existing arrangements, reflecting the increasing financial integration in the EU.  
The setting-up of the ESFS should significantly strengthen the coordination and 
convergence of supervisory standards and practices at the EU level, while retaining 
national responsibilities for direct supervision of institutions.  
The proposed establishment of the ESRB would allow enhancing substantially the 
scope of financial stability assessments at the EU level. In addition, the proposed role of 
the ESRB acknowledges the contribution already provided by central banks in the 
monitoring and assessment of financial risks and vulnerabilities, therefore fully 
exploiting the synergies with their activities and resources.  
A key condition for the efficient and effective functioning of this new two-pillar structure 
is to ensure an appropriate interplay between the EU macro-prudential function  – 
represented by the ESRB  – and the micro-prudential function  – represented by the 
ESFS. This requires a well-defined distribution of tasks, as well as working procedures 
which allow mutual support and exploiting synergies between the two functions. The 
future effectiveness of the new structures should be supported by the  timely 
implementation of the various actions that have been agreed upon, namely those set 
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out in the ECOFIN roadmap on crisis prevention, management and resolution of 20 
October 2009.  Page 23 
Timeline of the financial crisis since Summer 2007 
2007 
9 August:   BNP Paribas suspends calculation of asset values of three money market funds exposed 
to sub-prime and halts redemptions. 
    Interbank markets freeze due to loss in confidence. ECB injects €95 billion overnight to 
improve liquidity.  
14 September: Bank of England announces it has provided liquidity support to Northern Rock. A retail 
deposit run follows in the next days. 
2008 
15 September: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy.  
22 September: US Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, announces $700bn TARP bailout. Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley abandon their status as investment banks. 
29 September: Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg governments inject €11.2 billion in Fortis.  
30 September: Dexia receives equity capital injection from Belgian, French and Luxembourg 
governments and from existing shareholders. 
    Irish Government announces a blanket guarantee of all deposits. Other European 
governments follow with extensions to deposit guarantees. 
6 October:   German authorities announce package to rescue Hypo Real Estate. 
7 October:   The Icelandic Government takes control of Glitner and Landsbanki. 
8 October:   UK support package announced — including provision of 50 billion pound in capital to UK 
banks, guarantee for new short to medium-term senior unsecured debt issuance and the 
extension and widening of a Special Liquidity Scheme. 
    Interest rate cuts of 50 basis points by the ECB, the Bank of England, and the Federal 
Reserve. 
13 October:   Heads of State of the euro area meet for the first time and announce measures to 
provide their banks with capital funding (Paris Declaration). The European Council 
endorses the Paris Declaration on 15 and 16 October. 
19 October:   Dutch Government injects €10 billion into ING. UK government pledges 37 billion pounds 
to RBS, Lloyds and HBOS. German government commits to 500 billion euro bank rescue.  
27 October:  Hungary receives $15 billion loans from IMF, EU, and World Bank. 
24 November:  US rescues Citigroup with a $300 billion package. 
8 December:  EU agrees 200 billion euro stimulus package. 
22 December:  IMF provides $2.4 billion help to Latvia. 
     Three Irish banks get 5.5 billion euro rescue. 
2009 
28 February:  Publication of the De Larosière Report with recommendations on a new EU structure for 
financial supervision based on a two-pillar approach: macro-prudential and micro-
prudential supervision. 
2 April:    G20 Summit, in London. G20 agrees on the establishment of a new Financial Stability 
Board as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum, including all G20 countries, Spain 
and the European Commission, with a strengthened mandate to promote financial 
stability, a stronger institutional basis and enhanced resources. 
23 September: European Commission puts forwards its proposals for the establishment of a European 
Systemic Risk Board and of three European Supervisory Authorities. 
24 September: G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The G20 is designated as the premier forum for 
international economic cooperation, replacing the G8. 
20 October:   ECOFIN adopts European roadmap on crisis prevention, management and resolution. 
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